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Singapore’s Prescription for Successful Control of 
Transnational Emerging Infectious Diseases*
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome, a previously unknown emerging infectious dis-
ease, spread to multiple locations across continents in 2003 without being initially 
identified as a life-threatening infectious disease.  The Republic of Singapore, in 
Southeast Asia, was one of the countries/areas affected by the global outbreak.  With 
almost no existing procedures on how to deal with an emerging epidemic of such 
severity and rapid transmission, the country managed to formulate and implement 
policies to support countermeasures against this infectious disease.  The interven-
tions by the Singapore government covered of social and economic issues beyond 
the scope of public health, and promoted the involvement of governmental bodies 
and the general public.  This example set by Singapore has been well recognized by 
international communities as the employment of successful containment measures.  
By scrutinizing public health measures deployed by the country, this paper identifies 
a political will that was embodied in a total governmental approach toward the 
emerging infectious disease in 2003; analyzes the origin of governmental interven-
tion in health matters in the Republic; and shows why this country must choose to 
fiercely fight against health threats.
Keywords: Singapore, SARS, emerging infectious disease, Global City, 
transnational, political will, total governmental approach
I Introduction
In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerged as a serious threat to 
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worldwide health, resulting in 8,096 cases of infection and claiming 774 lives in 29 coun-
tries and areas.1)  Singapore fell prey to SARS between March and May 2003, reporting 
238 infected people and 33 deaths.   Hidden from human eyes, the entirely unknown 
emerging infectious disease (EID) of “the age of globalization” imposed political, eco-
nomic, and social threats in addition to medical challenges (World Health Organization 
(WHO) 2006, viii).2)  The spread of SARS in urban, developed, and modern healthcare 
settings raised concerns globally.  At the same time, the social attention to strict coun-
termeasures imposed by governments also increased.3)  The primary purpose of this 
paper is to analyze factors contributing to the success.  I will, in particular, evaluate the 
influential role of the Singapore govern ment in implementing infectious disease interven-
tion.  The government gained recognition for its effective containment of the spread of 
SARS.  The secondary purpose is to elucidate motives behind the proactive public health 
management in the Republic, which have existed since the inception of the young nation.
Before I proceed further, it is helpful to review two misconceptions pertaining to 
infectious diseases in developed economies such as modern Singapore.  The first mis-
conception is that infectious diseases no longer threaten the developed world, due likely 
to the perceived association between poverty and disease burden.  In reality, developed 
nations are not free from serious threats of infectious diseases.  In 1996, an entero-
hemorrhagic Escherichia coli O157 outbreak affected 9,451 patients and caused 12 deaths 
in Japan, then the second largest economy in the world.  The O157 serotype caused 
morbidity numbering in the thousands in subsequent years in Japan (Machida 2005, 
113–117).4)  In 2007, media reports on methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infec-
tion caused fear in the United States.5)  In 2009, the pandemic H1N1 influenza quickly 
spread beyond national and other territorial borders to affect both developed and develop-
ing areas globally.
1) The figure represents 21 percent of healthcare workers; 95 percent of cases were concentrated in 
12 countries/areas of the Western Pacific Region of the WHO (WHO 2006, 185).  The “Spanish flu” 
is believed to have claimed 20 million–100 million lives.
2) An emerging infectious disease refers to a disease “of infectious origin whose incidence in humans 
has increased within the recent past or threatens to increase in the near future,” including one that 
has emerged “in new geographic areas or increased abruptly” (WHO 2005, 1).
3) This paper will define a government as a governing body consisting of politicians and public servants 
engaged in the service of the supreme authority.
4) Morbidity is the condition of illness or abnormality, the rate at which an illness occurs in a particu-
lar population or area.
5) A report on the fatality in Virginia and outbreaks in schools across several states in the country was 
aired on October 16 and 18, 2007, as “the country is on the heels of the national crisis,” by the NBC 
Nightly News; “silent killer in hospitals, schools and day care centers that are often discovered 
when it is too late” was aired by the CBS Evening News on October 18, 2007.
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The second misconception is that developed countries can easily control disease 
outbreaks.  While superior healthcare facilities, laboratory capacities, and qualified profes-
sionals can contribute to effective responses vis-à-vis infectious diseases, engaging in 
active infectious disease management is largely at the discretion of individual govern-
ments.  Governments might, therefore, choose to direct their full attention to other 
political agendas despite the new International Health Regulation 2005 requiring each 
member state to fulfill its responsibility.  Additionally, high-quality healthcare is not 
synonymous with an ability to easily overcome infectious diseases.  This is because the 
primary focus of modern clinical medicine has shifted from preventive public health 
intervention in infectious diseases to the cure and care of chronic diseases, cancers, organ 
transplants, and other high-tech medicine.6)
The People’s Action Party (PAP), the de facto Singapore government, has governed 
Singapore uninterruptedly since 1959, when Singapore attained self-rule.  Singapore 
became an independent state in 1965.  At the end of the 20th century, a report published by 
the WHO ranked Singapore 6th among 191 members under the category of “Health sys-
tem performance in all Members States, WHO Indexes, estimates for 1997” (WHO 2000, 
200).  Key health indicators in 2009 were indeed impressive: Singapore’s infant mortal-
ity rate of 2.2 per 1,000 live births was one of the lowest in the world, and life expectancy 
at birth (male/female) stood at 79/83.7.  The high economic development of Singapore 
today as well as its small land size (712.4 km2 as of 2010)—equivalent to that of Bahrain or 
Amami oshima of Japan—are often used to explain Singapore’s achievements in general.
The view that Singapore’s economic development and small size account for the 
country’s success in infectious disease management is too simplistic.  Singapore has an 
environment suitable for the propagation of most pathogens.  First, the island state is 
located 137 km north of the equator, and its tropical climate is characterized by high 
temperature and high humidity in addition to abundant rainfall.  While Singapore is gen-
erally spared from natural disasters like earthquakes and tropical cyclones, it is the only 
industrialized nation situated in a tropical climate zone where infectious diseases are 
prevalent.  Thus, Singapore faces far more health challenges than other developed soci-
eties.  Second, the urban city-state faces further increase in population density.  Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Trade & Industry, the total population was 1.9 million in 1965.  The 
number increased to 5.08 million by the end of June 2010, composed of citizens (64 per-
cent), permanent residents (11 percent), and others (25 percent).7)  Whereas the overall 
population density was 7,022 persons per km2 in 2009, the central business district in 
6) Although its definition varies, public health is concerned with population health.
7) The ethnic composition of the majority of the population (citizens and permanent residents) was 
Chinese (74.1 percent), Malays (13.4 percent), Indians (9.2 percent), and others (3.3 percent).
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the south central part of the main island is even more densely populated.  More than 85 
percent of the main island is already built up with residential, commercial, and industrial 
zones.  Third, Singapore, identified as the financial, medical, and industrial hub in the 
region,8) experiences frequent movements of population.  Although rural migration to 
urban areas within the country—typically seen in other urbanized areas in Southeast 
Asia—is absent, the movements of people in Singapore include not only students, tourists, 
business visitors, and foreign executives but also foreign migrant workers.  These  inherent 
conditions should not be underestimated.
As a result of frequent interactions between humans and pathogens in overcrowded 
urban areas, infectious diseases can be transmitted much easier in this tropical urban 
city-state than in less-populated rural areas.  As long as Singapore desires to keep its 
national borders open to the global economy, importation of infectious diseases is inevi-
table.  Referring to the period of the SARS outbreak, the then minister for national 
development stated that Singapore could not close its borders because of its role as “an 
international air hub and a major financial and business center” (Ministry of National 
Development 2003).
Focusing on etiology and clinical management, abundant scientific and medical 
research, e.g. by WHO (2003), has furthered the understanding of the new global health 
threat.  The WHO (2006) not only provides details of the epidemiology, but also evaluates 
governmental responses of several countries and areas including Singapore.  In the 
WHO’s 2006 publication, the Singapore government received good recognition: “Early 
cooperation from Singapore provided essential information that helped the global control 
of the SARS outbreak” (ibid., 106).
An objective evaluation of Singapore’s SARS containment measures from a political 
perspective is provided by Khai Leong Ho (2003) in an analysis of six Asian governments. 
Ho notes that others referred to Singapore’s policies and concludes that the country’s 
“right steps in the right directions” could stem from its “authoritarian” political environ-
ment, compact geographical size, and timeliness of actions.  Chorh-Chuan Tan (2006) 
reviews achievements and shortcomings of Singapore’s measures and attributes the 
outbreak containment to “strong political leadership and effective command, control and 
coordination of responses.”  On the other hand, Kai Khiun Liew (2006) blames the ruling 
party for “framing the containment of SARS in militaristic terms rather than as a public 
health issue” to “reinforce” political legitimacy.  However, this condemnation can be 
challenged since words such as beat, defeat, and fight are commonly used when referring 
8) Besides port businesses generating movements of goods and people, Changi Airport in Singapore 
handled in excess of 35 million passengers and 214,000 aircraft in 2006, servicing 183 cities in 57 
countries (De Koninck et al. 2008, 60).
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to actions to overcome diseases.
As for health policy formulation, Peggy Teo et al. (2005) present a compelling argu-
ment that decisions relying heavily on biomedical research alone could misplace social 
perspectives, pointing out possible “overpolicing” even among the historically compliant 
Singapore citizens.  In contrast, legal implications of infectious disease management in 
Singapore are documented by Catherine Tay (2003), giving a good argument to support 
the legality of strict enforcement of public health measures.
Mui Hoong Chua (2004) expands the scope to observe the implementation and effects 
of Singapore’s measures in such areas as national cohesion, state actions, community 
reaction, and individual effort.  A household survey in May 2003 revealed that more than 
80 percent of respondents approved of official information and “authorities’ openness to 
communication” had a positive effect on compliance with preventive measures (Quah 
and Lee 2004).  Another community survey conducted by Gabriel Leung et al. (2004) 
toward the end of the outbreaks found that Singapore respondents showed lower anxiety 
than residents in Hong Kong (HK).
Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) (2004) contributed its perspective on healthcare 
professionals and modern healthcare institutions in Singapore, recounting hardships  during 
the SARS outbreak.  Stronger evidence of the burden is reported by Kang Sim et al. (2004) 
and David Koh et al. (2005), revealing sufficient SARS-related psychiatric and posttrau-
matic morbidity based on surveys conducted in healthcare settings in Singapore in July 
and mid-May to mid-July 2003, respectively.9)
Regarding overall public health measures, Kee Tai Goh et al. (2006) discuss initial 
weaknesses and improvements that were subsequently made, analyzing the epidemi-
ology in hospitals, a laboratory, and communities in Singapore.  Kee Tai Goh and Suok 
Kai Chew (2006) call for attention to EIDs by providing comprehensive accounts of the 
SARS transmissions, details of painstaking public health prevention and control mea-
sures, and the “framework” of SARS response in Singapore.
However, the existing scholarly research has not fully examined in detail the mech-
anism allowing the tiny nation to perform such a massive-scale infectious disease control 
nor explained why infectious diseases are recognized as important issues in the city-state. 
I will, therefore, analyze the emergency response of policy makers, public health policy 
implementation by health authorities, and involvement of local people.  This analysis will 
involve public health perspectives and political, economic, and social issues.  The result 
indicates that Singapore’s SARS management reflects the influence of political leaders. 
9) Interestingly, D. H. Phua et al. (2005) report less psychiatric morbidity among healthcare providers 
in the emergency department of a hospital in Singapore, pointing out a couple of explanations includ-
ing unique ties among the staff.
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I will then show that this political will was present much earlier by tracing Singapore’s 
public health efforts to the first two decades immediately after the inception of the nation 
in 1965, when the country was susceptible to frequent outbreaks of classical infectious 
diseases.  The measures implemented as national strategy earlier will reveal Singapore’s 
political determination to continue controlling infectious diseases.  My hypothesis—that 
historically embedded political will ensures Singapore’s active governmental intervention 
in infectious diseases such as SARS—can then be tested.
II Methods and Materials
An area studies approach adopted in the present research combined literature investiga-
tion and extensive fieldwork in situ.  Preliminary fieldwork was carried out in September 
2006, when the feasibility of collecting information through interviews with civil servants, 
academics, scientists, healthcare providers, and other resource persons was confirmed. 
Subsequently, six fieldwork trips were conducted, mostly in Singapore, in 2007 and 2008, 
as shown in Table 1.
The fieldwork allowed access to governmental documents and local newspaper 
Table 1 Periods of Fieldwork, Major Organizations Visited, and Conferences
Attended between 2006 and 2008
Periods of Fieldwork Organizations Interviewed, Conferences Attended (Selected List)
Sept. 6–26, 2006 National University of Singapore
Public Hospital A
Private Hospital A
Feb. 3–Mar. 29, 2007 Ministry of Health
Private Hospital B
Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention Center
National Environment Agency, Head Office
Aug. 17–31, 2007 Private Hospital C
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
Health Promotion Board
World Health Organization, Western Pacific Regional Office*
Asian Development Bank*
Oct. 2–6, 2007 Environment Health Institute
Mar. 15–25, 2008 Tan Tock Seng Hospital (reference public hospital for SARS)
Ministry of Health
Singapore Medical Council
May 1–10, 2008 Health Promotion Board
Sept. 1–15, 2008 Capacity Building in the Prevention of Contagious Diseases
Training Course (organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 




Note: * These are located in Manila, the Republic of the Philippines, while all others are in Singapore.
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articles containing information from the 1960s to the 1980s.  Interviews with health 
authorities at the Ministry of Health (MOH), its related organizations, and healthcare 
professionals displayed their hands-on approach in responding to the SARS outbreak and 
frequent references to the past struggle with infectious diseases.  Furthermore, the 
fieldwork in Singapore generated favorable circumstances, i.e., direct observation and 
interaction with resource persons and other residents to evaluate how policies are actu-
ally implemented.  It was beneficial to learn the views of international organizations 
toward the SARS threat and Singapore’s contribution in Manila in 2007.  In addition, the 
author visited Singapore eight times between March 2009 and June 2011 (not listed in 
Table 1) for another research project, which provided opportunities to follow up this 
research.  All field trips were funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 
and this author.
III Results: Singapore’s Anti-SARS Response
III-1 Being “UNIQUELY Singapore”10) against SARS
“Atypical pneumonia” was the initial description of the disease that turned out later to 
be an extremely dangerous new infection.  Most cases were caused by direct contact with 
infectious materials like respiratory secretions from a person with the disease; the 
incubation period ranged from 2 to 10 days.  The etiological agent was subsequently 
identified as a new strain of coronavirus (CoV), and the microorganism was later named 
SARS-CoV.  The EID was first imported into the city-state from HK by a Singaporean 
tourist who stayed at the Metropole Hotel, where the “super spreader” from the People’s 
Republic of China checked in on February 21, 2003, the beginning of annus horribilis. 
Literally one overnight stay of the symptomatic individual was enough for the lethal virus 
to infect as many as 16 hotel guests and one visitor.11)  From here, the virus rapidly  traveled 
to Canada, Vietnam, and Singapore along air routes.  Patients initially complained of 
general symptoms like fever and cough, and SARS managed to deceive even ex perienced 
healthcare workers before developing into full-blown outbreaks at modern hospitals in 
10) An expression used by the Singapore Tourism Board for brand promotion of the city-state.
11) HK Department of Health learned of the index case on February 24, but the linkage to the hotel 
failed to attract initial attention.  The warning pointing to the hotel, arrived from Singapore on March 
13 and then the federal health authority Health Canada on March 18.  “Only then did the Department 
of Health start reviewing all its files on reported cases of severe community-acquired pneumonia” 
(WHO 2006, 142).  HK authorities may have an alternative explanation, as detailed in “SARS in 
Hong Kong: from Experience to Action,” report, http://www.sars-expertcom.gov.hk/english/reports/
reports.html, accessed August 9, 2011.
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urban cities like HK, Singapore, and Toronto, “bringing some public-health systems to 
their knees” (WHO 2006, vii).12)  Soon, international trade stalled, tourism suffered, and 
stock markets plunged.
The prime minister of the Republic of Singapore at the time, Goh Chok Tong, took 
a very proactive role in the battle against SARS.  On April 19, he conveyed the firm stance 
of the Singapore government to the people and asked for social responsibility from all 
Singaporeans at a media conference.  This was followed by a parliamentary speech 
delivered on April 24 by the current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who was then the 
deputy prime minister and finance minister.  He spoke about the three “battlefronts” 
that the government was determined to control: public health, economy, and society.  He 
stressed the last as being the most “critical” and added: “Government is doing everything 
possible.  But for these policies and measures to succeed, every Singaporean must play 
his part” (Chua 2004, 110).  The political leaders uniquely pulled together politicians, 
civil servants, scientists,13) medical professionals, and the general public during the SARS 
outbreak.  Singapore’s efforts to control SARS were praised by the WHO, who described 
it as “a 21st-century model for epidemic control,” referring to the effective public health 
measures and the careful plans of the government to promote support from the community 
(WHO 2006, 245).
The following five sections will investigate each of the distinctive areas in the 
containment of SARS in Singapore and show that the influencing forces boil down to a 
single factor: political will, which called for a total governmental approach.14)
III-2 Benefitting from the Rapid Response of Organizations and Groups
One of the notable features of Singapore’s SARS management was the quick mobilization 
of human resources that was enabled by the country’s organizations.  Table 2 presents 
the major organizations that handled SARS management in Singapore.  The MOH 
organ ized a task force only two days after Singapore learned about the first global alert 
on atypical pneumonia from the WHO.  The government modified or added organizations 
to enhance its ability in making speedy decisions and implementing policies.
This flexibility is criticized by Michael Barr and Zlatko Skrbiš (2008), who judge that 
the government was incapable of controlling the SARS outbreak and that the response 
12) The nonspecific initial clinical features include fever (>38°C), chills, headache, malaise, myalgia, 
and diarrhea.  Consequently, 20–25 percent of patients required intensive care (WHO 2006, 178).
13) Local laboratory experts devoted to pursue the new SARS-CoV and development of early diagnostic 
tests (WHO 2006, 106).
14) Containment is reduction of morbidity and mortality to levels at which the disease is no longer 
considered to be a public health problem.
Singapore’s Prescription for Successful Control of Transnational Emerging Infectious Diseases 309
was “ad hoc and reactive” (ibid., 255).  Being knowledgeable of Singapore’s health system 
but critical of the PAP’s rule, Barr dismisses Singapore’s SARS management as  having 
been incapably stagnant for the first five weeks (Barr 2005, 168).  This negative evalua-
tion contradicts the findings by the majority of researchers, including those from the 
WHO, who have conducted numerous investigations into the microbiological, epidemio-
logical and  clinical features of SARS.
When problems went beyond the purview of medicine and the situation deteriorated 
globally, on April 7 Prime Ministry Goh Chok Tong established the Ministerial Commit-
tee on SARS, consisting of ministers (politicians) to strengthen the Executive Group of 
senior civil servants.15)  The prime minister gave the committee a mission to provide 
policy opinions and strategic arrangements.  His decision was a resolute step because 
the SARS management demanded a prescription that was different from previously 
known infectious diseases.  For the cross-ministry coordination, the MOH in turn formed 
the Inter-Ministry SARS Operations Committee chaired by the ministry’s senior director 
of operations.
15) Now known as the Homefront Crisis Executive Group, the group has been in existence since 1973. 
The group was activated in the past, for example in 1999 when the Nipah virus infection was imported 
from Malaysia.
Table 2 Three Major Governmental Groups in Charge of SARS Management
Executive Group MOH SARS Task Force Ministerial Committee
on SARS*
Formed in/on 1973 March 15, 2003 April 7, 2003
Chaired by Permanent  Secretary of 
Home Affairs
Director of Medical Services, 
MOH
Members Permanent Secretaries
(senior civil servants) of 
relevant ministries, such as 
the MOH, the Ministry of 
Defense, and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, joined
by other ministries
depending on the nature 











•Senior Ministers of State 
(Education and Trade and 
Industry, Transport and 
Information, Communi-
cations and the Arts)
•Ministers of State (Health
and Environment, Man-
power and Education)




To formulate strategies to 
rapidly control the spread
of SARS
To provide political guidance
and strategic decisions for 
mitigation of the socio-
economic damage caused 
by SARS
Note: * Details are in a press release dated April 7, 2003, at http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.
aspx?nid=ODI4-PvfDQeVER4s%3D, accessed August 7, 2011.
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Referring to the works of Barr, Rodney King (2008) notes that “responsibility for 
handling the crisis was taken from the Minister for Health and then given to two minis-
terial committees” (ibid., 131).  However, the health minister remained active in SARS 
management while non-clinical issues were coordinated by the committees.  Singapore’s 
political leaders and public administration actually showed a unique concerted effort upon 
this pressing challenge.
The government effectively mobilized additional human resources in public services. 
An example was a flexible arrangement for the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to assist the MOH with both physically labor-intensive 
and time-sensitive tasks requiring a strong chain of command.16)  An army brigadier-
general was seconded to the MOH to play a directive role such as conversion of vacant 
flats into quarantine quarters and large-scale contact tracing tasks.  A statutory board 
under the MINDEF,17) the national authority on military technology and weapons known 
as the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA), set up an IT system to trace 
diverse contacts.  They ranged from healthcare providers, family members, visitors at 
healthcare institutions, school teachers, classmates, and workplace colleagues to com-
muters in close proximity to SARS cases (Goh et al. 2006, 302).  Furthermore, the DSTA 
provided radio frequency identification tags for hospital infection control measures, which 
prevented accidental movements of healthcare providers beyond wards used for isolating 
SARS cases.
Another source enabling the dominant PAP to quickly mobilize resources was the 
People’s Association (PA).  Established by the PAP in 1960, the PA is a statutory board 
chaired by the prime minister, and connects many grassroots organizations in Singapore 
with the government.  Working with members of parliament, the PA functions to 
“strengthen racial harmony and social cohesion” and disseminates the government’s 
vision and common goals to the community.18)  During the SARS outbreak, PA volunteers 
fluent in various Chinese dialects supported the English-speaking health officials.  When 
the Singapore Civil Defence Force provided language assistance to individuals requiring 
translation during the contact tracing operations, 66 PA volunteers supported the task 
(Chua 2004, 81).19)  Following the community outbreak at the Pasir Panjang wholesale 
vegetable center, the multilingual PA was mobilized jointly with the SAF and the police 
16) On April 23, 250 army personnel were deployed to the MOH for two months (Goh et al. 2006, 
302).
17) Established by the PAP, statutory boards are governmental organizations under relevant ministries.
18) Details are at http://www.pa.gov.sg/home.html, accessed August 8, 2011.
19) The PA volunteers included businessmen, members of educational, religious, and other institutions, 
senior citizens, and members of ladies clubs.
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to rapidly cordon off the market.  The PA volunteers administered fever checks in the 
community and distributed 1.1 million SARS kits consisting of thermometers, masks, 
and other items to every household (ibid., 123).  Since SARS required an unprecedented 
scale and speed of mobilization of human resources, those in public services, the private 
sector, NGOs, schoolchildren, and volunteers responded.
In contrast, overconfidence and “the lack of broad general views of risk manage-
ment” (Tambyah and Leung 2006, xxiii) could have contributed to the slower response 
in HK.  The situation was made even more complicated by a concern that the novel 
disease might be due to the feared human-to-human transmitting H5N1 influenza.  Table 
3 shows that Singapore preceded not only HK but also Taiwan and Canada in isolation of 
probable cases and amendment of the law to include SARS as a legally notifiable disease. 
Singapore designated a SARS-dedicated hospital on March 22 and HK on March 26.20)
The quicker actions of Singapore could partially explain the remarkable differences in 
outcome; the WHO removed Singapore from the list of SARS-affected areas on May 31, 
ahead of other locations, based on the condition for removal requiring the absence of new 
locally acquired cases for 20 days (Table 3).  Singapore, with two-thirds the population of 
HK but one-seventh the number of patients and one-ninth the number of deaths, had a 
Table 3 Highlights of Actions, Events, and Outcome in SARS-affected Developed Areas
Singapore Hong Kong Taipei, Taiwan Toronto andVancouver, Canada
Date of SARS onset Feb. 25 Feb. 15 Feb. 25 Feb. 23
Isolation of probable 
cases
Mar. 6 Mar. 11 Mar. 15 Mar. 13
Making SARS notification 
mandatory
Mar. 17 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar. 25
Home quarantine of close
contacts of probable 
cases
Mar. 24 Apr. 10 Mar. 18
Travel advisory from
WHO
No Apr. 2–May 23 May 8 (Taipei)
May 21 (all)–June 17
Apr. 23–28
(Toronto)
Removal from list of 
affected areas by WHO
May 311) June 23 July 5 July 2
Total population 4.3 million 6.9 million 2.6 million2) 6.7 million3)
Reported cases 238 1,755 346 251
Deaths 33 299 37 43
Source: Modified from WHO (2006; 2007).
Note: 1) Date of removal differs among literatures; some sources like Chua (2004) state it as May 30.
2) (Taipei City Government 2005).  Population of Taiwan was approximately 23 million.
3) It consists of 4.7 million in Greater Toronto area and 2 million in Vancouver out of 32 million in 
Canada.
20) HK implemented the policy on March 29, 2003.
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much smaller scale of spread.  Following Vietnam, where foreigners initiated outbreak 
control, Singapore became the second country to contain the local transmission of SARS. 
The city-state “attracted a slew of very positive comments from even its most skeptical 
foreign critics” (Ho 2003, 196).
III-3 Preserving Consistency and Accuracy in Information Disclosure
As the Asian Development Bank recognized the magnitude of “isolation from the global 
community” of certain countries during the SARS period (Peralta and Hunt 2003, 79), a 
lack of transparency or insufficient information disclosure of health risks of global sig-
nificance resulted in international condemnation.  The People’s Republic of China was 
criticized for not having shared knowledge of new epidemic risks sooner, because the 
inaction delayed global awareness of the health peril.  Although the government in China 
“was initially reluctant to disclose the gravity of the situation” (Fan and Chen 2007, 147), 
the newly sworn in President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao replaced the mayor of 
Beijing and the minister of health, and demonstrated a dramatically different approach in 
disclosing the epidemic situation (Abraham 2007, 103).
In contrast, Singapore maintained constant communication with international com-
munities.  The WHO recalls that occasional telephone conversations with Singapore’s 
health minister enabled the agency to judge Singapore’s situation as unlikely to threaten 
the public health of the global community.  This assessment led the WHO not to issue a 
travel advisory for Singapore (WHO 2006, ix) but to issue advisories for HK, Guangdong, 
Beijing, Shanxi, Toronto, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Taipei, and Hubei.
In addition, Singapore’s proactive information disclosure was uncompromised even 
when the MOH—observing the first global health alert three days earlier—communi-
cated to the WHO soon after finding out that a potentially SARS-infected Singaporean 
physician was on a flight to Frankfurt.  Singapore’s timely information was praiseworthy, 
as delayed action would have resulted in serious outcomes not only in Germany but also 
in many other parts of the world.
Initiating regular press releases and conferences, Singapore provided complete and 
timely information.  However, biased foreign media information circulated.  In response, 
the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA) engaged relevant 
agencies in monitoring and investigating reports, tracking down rumors, and verifying 
information (Chua 2004, 112).  The Ministry of Home Affairs refuted an erroneous report 
in the Malaysian press (MHA 2003).
Furthermore, Singapore succeeded in mobilizing the local mass media to alleviate 
the fears of the public by airing updated information and educational messages.  In other 
words, the mass media became effective tools of risk communication.  On May 21, 2003, 
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Singapore Press Holdings (a government-controlled press), Starhub (a telecommuni-
cations company), and Mediacorp (a media company) established the SARS TV channel, 
which streamlined SARS-related information by broadcasting programs in English, 
Mandarin, Malay, Tamil, and some Chinese dialects to capture as wide a viewership as 
possible (Chua 2004, 155–156).21)  The print media disseminated educational materials 
prepared by government agencies such as the Health Promotion Board under the MOH. 
By and large, it can be said that the efforts at information disclosure demonstrated by the 
Singapore government won the praise of international health organizations and Singapore 
residents alike (Chan 2006, 361).
III-4 Rectifying Weaknesses of Healthcare Settings and Public Health Environment
Upon the emergence of SARS, the national referral center in charge of treating infectious 
diseases known as the Communicable Disease Centre (CDC) could not cope due to insuf-
ficient space.22)  The CDC added 40 isolation rooms by May 7 and another 40 by May 17, 
and a new national center—CDC2—with 39 isolation and 18 ICU beds was constructed. 
Thus, the authorities improved healthcare infrastructure and capability with remarkable 
speed and magnitude.  Three containment strategies, i.e., closure, ring fencing, and con-
centration of cases, were implemented at hospitals (Goh and Chew 2006, 294).  TTSH 
no longer accepted other patients but became the designated SARS healthcare institution. 
The decision to centralize all SARS cases appears sensible, as it mitigated the risk of 
transmission in other healthcare settings.23)
The SARS-dedicated modern hospital suffered a few ill effects.  The frequent trans-
mission of the virus among healthcare professionals unveiled a gap in the use of N95 
masks at TTSH (TTSH 2004, 24).  The largest cluster of nosocomial, or hospital-acquired, 
transmission occurred among patients in the more crowded eight-bedded wards, reflect-
ing cost pressure at modern hospitals.  The SARS experience made the MOH stockpile 
up to six months’ worth of personal protective equipment supplies in preparation for 
surges in demand; and all other hospitals enhanced contingency plans (Goh and Chew 
2006, 300–301).  TTSH reduced the number of beds per ward to allow adequate distance 
among patients.  Moreover, Singapore implemented a color-coded alert system that 
21) A MICA officer explained to me in a personal interview in March 2010 that the timing of the  channel 
setup should have been much earlier to be more effective.
22) Since the CDC alone could not respond to the sudden surge in demand to isolate patients, TTSH—
located opposite the CDC—used its general wards, which potentially resulted in more cases at the 
hospital (TTSH 2004, 24).
23) Triage functions were established at polyclinics to screen patients with fever, which reduced the 
burden on hospitals and facilitated early defection.
M. J. YOSHIKAWA314
defined three levels of local transmission of infectious diseases and response protocols 
(MOH 2004, 1–5).  This framework was applied for a pandemic influenza preparedness 
plan in Singapore (Goh et al. 2006, 311).  Hence, the country’s competency in infectious 
disease management improved.24)
The government also saw it necessary to provide a safer environment to protect 
healthy individuals from SARS.  The National Environment Agency (NEA) under the 
Ministry of Environment and Water Resources promoted a campaign emphasizing per-
sonal hygiene and environmental cleanliness.  The NEA escalated many regular public 
services, e.g., cleaning and disinfecting public areas, culling pests, checking on waste 
disposal and collection, and inspecting sewerage systems.
A much more direct public health intervention, however, became necessary to dis-
rupt the route of infection of SARS, which was transmitted from human to human.  “When 
SARS emerged in Singapore in 2003 and contacts started to come down with the disease, 
my Minister for Health asked what could be done to prevent transmission.  I suggested 
home quarantine but cautioned that it would be very difficult to enforce,” said Dr. Goh 
Kee Tai.25)  After a few decades of absence of serious human-to-human transmissible 
infectious disease outbreaks, Singapore was not ready to implement the isolation proce-
dure.  Goh recalls the struggle: “we had to learn from scratch the operational problems 
of quarantining thousands of contacts during the outbreak.”26)  In fact, the implementation 
of quarantine measures generated problems requiring active social management, which 
the next section will explain.
III-5 Addressing Social Issues with a Carrot-and-Stick Policy
The Environmental Public Health Act, which made littering or spitting in public places 
an offense, was already in effect before SARS struck Singapore.  During the SARS out-
break, these offensive and irresponsible acts were considered anti-social due to their role 
in the spreading of germs (Tay 2003, 20).  The MOH invoked the Infectious Diseases 
Act on March 24 and empowered health officers to carry out investigation, surveillance, 
and isolation.  The mandatory Home Quarantine Order (HQO) was implemented by 
24) Rapid identification and isolation as the precautionary measures implemented during the March–May 
period may have worked to prevent further transmission when a 27-year-old Chinese Singaporean 
contracted SARS through accidental contamination in a microbiology laboratory in September 2003 
(WHO 2006, 46).
25) Personal communication (an e-mail from Dr. Goh Kee Tai, received on October 26, 2007).
26) Personal communication (an e-mail from Dr. Goh Kee Tai, received on October 26, 2007).  Goh was 
the head of the Quarantine and Epidemiology Department, Ministry of the Environment, from 1978 
to 2003, and was involved in the revision of the infectious disease legislation in 1976.
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minis terial cooperation with the PA.  The HQO required each person identified as having 
been in close contact with a SARS patient to stay at home for 10 days.  The MOH hired 
officers (uniformed like police officers) from the government-linked security agency 
CISCO; the officers delivered HQOs and installed electronic surveillance cameras at the 
residences of  quarantined individuals.  Then, home surveillance personnel would tele-
phone these  individuals at random intervals daily to ask them to turn on and stand in front 
of the cameras.  Offenders who violated the HQOs were monitored with electronic tags 
to make sure they stayed at home.27)
On top of strict laws and active persuasion by political leaders to ask residents to 
cooperate, the government provided social support to assist the individuals under the 
HQOs.  The MOH sent nurses to provide medical advice.  In addition, alternative 
premises were arranged for those who preferred to minimize disruption to other family 
members.  An excursion to Jurong Bird Park, an aviary park, was arranged to cheer up 
families under quarantine.  The Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports 
and the National Council of Social Service mobilized five welfare organizations to provide 
elderly care arrangements and counseling.  PA volunteers delivered food to quarantined 
people.  The government swiftly appointed Community Development Councils to admin-
ister an allowance scheme, which provided financial aid to those who had lost income due 
to HQOs.28)  In total, more than 8,000 HQOs were issued (Tan 2006, 347).  Although 
negative reaction to this  intrusion of privacy was natural, a survey in Singapore showed 
as many as 93 percent of sampled individuals indicating a willingness to observe quar-
antine measures (Teo et al. 2005, 287).
However, a serious social problem soon surfaced.  The quarantined individuals 
became feared as sources of infection.  Lee Hsien Loong spoke against the discrimination 
and stigma on May 1, 2003; “[p]eople on HQOs are not dangerous, neither have they 
done anything wrong.  It is just sheer bad luck that they came into contact with a SARS 
case. . . .  They should not be feared or stigmatized” (MOH 2003).
Similarly, the general public came to avoid healthcare institutions and workers, 
potentially triggered by the approximately 76 percent of nosocomial cases in Singapore 
27) The Infectious Diseases Act was further amended to ensure compliance with the HQO.  According 
to section 65, offenders could be jailed for up to 6 months and/or fined S$10,000 upon conviction for 
the first offense, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding 12 months and/or fined S$20,000 for the 
second and subsequent offenses (Chua 2004, 124–127; Tay 2003, 50).  Even the high-profile Madam 
Kwa Geok Choo, the wife of then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, was quarantined at home after 
having undergone an ultrasound scan examination at a hospital where a SARS case was reported.
28) The scheme provided self-employed people with S$70 a day and employed people with an amount 
equal to their daily salary, up to a maximum of S$70 a day, during the quarantine period (Chua 2004, 
123).
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(WHO 2006, 189).29)  “Being a TTSH nurse had quickly become a stigma in the public 
eye,” and some landlords asked nurses who worked for the hospital to move out (TTSH 
2004, 116).  The government soon responded: a hotline service for healthcare workers 
was established, and political leaders actively tried to influence the opinions of the people. 
Politicians delivered speeches urging the general public to show appreciation and express 
backing to healthcare professionals.
Soon, the Caring for SARS Caregivers project was initiated with the support of the 
Red Cross.  Many healthcare workers in Singapore even volunteered to work in SARS 
wards.  In contrast, wages had to be raised in Canada to retain staff, and 25 healthcare 
workers in Taiwan walked out in reaction to ring fencing of an affected hospital (Chua 
2004, 186).  A potential explanation for the outstanding dedication and professionalism 
displayed by healthcare workers in Singapore came from the former president of the 
Singapore Nurses Association: leadership-led elevation of healthcare professionals through 
media glorified their roles; social support provided by the government, such as accom-
modation arrangements, helped them concentrate and focus on their duties; and the 
younger nurses were especially motivated to overcome their fears and show courage.30)
III-6 Stimulating Economy by the Mobilization of Financial Resources
Despite the best efforts of the Singapore government, the epidemic still had a devastat-
ing economic impact.  SARS inflicted damage on Singapore’s image as an attractive busi-
ness and tourist destination.  Although Singapore disclosed risk information and the WHO 
did not issue a travel advisory for the city-state, average hotel occupancy rates fell to 40 
percent; inbound visitor arrivals dropped sharply, and retail, including restaurant sales, 
declined by the second quarter (Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 2003, 10).31)  Table 
4 gives details of the S$230 million urgent financial relief package announced on April 17 
by the government to rescue severely impacted industries such as the airline, cruise, 
hotel, and restaurant industries as well as affected individuals in taxi services and travel 
agents.  As restoration of confidence in tourism was deemed necessary, the government 
set up an international image task force.  Reportedly, foreign tour organizers were invited 
to Singapore to observe the tight control measures implemented at Changi International 
29) Other sources report slightly different percentages.  Certain medical procedures such as aerosoliza-
tion of respiratory secretions (e.g., intubation: the use of nebulizers, suction, or assisted ventilation) 
may have caused the transmission in healthcare settings.
30) Personal interview with Tan Wee King in Singapore on August 25, 2007.  Her view supports findings 
by D. H. Phua et al. (2005).
31) Visitor arrivals fell by nearly 100 percent on a seasonally adjusted annualized rate basis (MAS 2003, 
10).
Singapore’s Prescription for Successful Control of Transnational Emerging Infectious Diseases 317
Airport.  The decisiveness of the policy may have saved the macro economy from a much 
larger and more prolonged downturn.
IV Discussion
The previous section described examples of challenges faced and measures implemented 
by the Singapore government in response to SARS.  Singapore’s massive and wide range 
of reactions to SARS prompts the question as to why the city-state takes such an aggres-
sive stance in defending against EIDs.  In addition to SARS, the Singapore government 
is also active and persistent in fighting against mosquito-borne infectious diseases such 
as dengue virus infection and chikungunya fever.32)  In this  section, I will discuss the 
32) Dengue virus infection re-emerged in Singapore in the late 1990s, and Singapore scaled up its 
national control program, especially after the regional outbreak in 2005 (Yoshikawa 2010, 66–67). 
Singapore controlled the first local outbreak of chikungunya fever quickly and enhanced control 
measures to deal with the subsequent outbreaks in 2008 (Yoshikawa et al. 2010, 41–42).
Table 4 S$230 Million SARS Relief Package
Items S$million
Tourism-related industries
1 Additional property tax rebates for commercial properties 56
2 Higher property tax rebates for gazetted tourist hotels1) 8
3 50% reduction in Foreign Worker Levy for unskilled workers in gazetted tourist hotels 2
4 100% rebate of TV license fees for gazetted tourist hotels 2
5 Cess (indirect tax) rebate and waiver of cess security deposit 20
6 Bridging Loan Program for tourism-related small-medium enterprises 10
7 Enhanced training grant for certain approved tourism-related courses 57
Transport sector
8 Diesel tax rebates for taxis 25
9 Waiver of taxi operator license fees 3
10 Road tax rebates and flexible laying-up procedures for buses 0.3
11 Relief measures for the aviation industry 45
12 50% reduction in port dues for cruise ships 0.2
Funds for SARS victims, grants to families, and awards to healthcare workers
13 S$1 million up-front contribution to Courage Fund 1
14 Matching grant to Courage Fund2) –
Total 230
Source: Modified from MAS (2003, 15).
Note: 1) Gazetted tourist hotels are premises declared under the Singapore Tourism Act.
2) Other measures except for this item ended by December 31, 2003.
M. J. YOSHIKAWA318
motivation behind the Singapore government’s desire to control infectious diseases and 
show that this political will has been exercised over decades.  It appears that the seem-
ingly overreactive measures have their roots in the core values or strategies selected by 
the first generation of political leaders at the birth of the nation, when controlling infec-
tious diseases was not an option but a necessity.
IV-1 Singapore’s Aim to Become a Global City
“History teaches that the improvement of human health at the population level is largely 
determined by good policies . . . ” (Peralta and Hunt 2003, 1).
Singapore’s encounter with infectious diseases dates back to the days when the 
territory was a former British colonial trading port.  During the colonization, migrant 
workers especially suffered from a wide range of diseases.  Singapore saw smallpox, 
plague, diphtheria, cholera, and malaria in the early 20th century; typhoid in the 1930s; 
polio in the 1940s and 1958; and Asian influenza in 1957 (Chan and Ting 2007, 8–10).
Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963, and was expelled 
from the federation two years later.  The Republic of Singapore was born on August 9, 
1965.  The loss of an important hinterland presented new challenges, and the young 
nation was required to alter policies.  The new country was full of people to feed but had 
few natural resources, insufficient agricultural products, a sluggish economy, and no 
particular industry.33)  Under the backdrop of 10 percent unemployment in Singapore in 
the 1960s (Trocki 2006, 148),34) President Sukarno’s Confrontation Policy in Indonesia, 
and the need to keep a distance from the communist-ruled People’s Republic of China, 
three issues haunted Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s prime minister from 1959 to 1990. 
These issues were international recognition, defense, and the economy (Lee 2000, 
22–23).  The overnight S$157 million loss due to the devaluation of the sterling pound in 
November 1967 (Tan 2007, 137),35) and the British withdrawal from Singapore, deprived 
the new nation of 70,000 service jobs (Lee 2000, 69).  Chong-Yah Lee calculated the 
impact as 15–16 percent of gross national product between 1968 and 1971 (Lee 1980, 4, 
33) About a quarter of the territory produced poultry, pork, and half of the vegetables required in 1960 
(De Koninck et al. 2008, 40).  A midyear estimate of the population in 1965 was 1,864,900 (MOH 
1968, 35).
34) Non-seasonally adjusted total unemployment rates for June 1957 and 1970 show 5 percent and 8.2 
percent respectively (MTI 2007, 15), and 14 percent is reported right after independence (Lee 2000, 
23) and for slightly earlier years (Tan 2007, 85).
35) Devaluation was from USD/GBP 2.80 to 2.40 and caused Singapore to lose 14.3 percent of its  sterling 
reserves, according to Lee (2000, 57).  However, Singapore’s civil servant Ngiam Tong Dow said 
that the devaluation caused only moderate damage (Tay 2006, 45).
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41).  Thus, pessimism prevailed: “Economically and politically separate from Malaysia, 
militarily separate from the UK, not many would have predicted the economic success 
and political stability . . . ” (Trocki 2006, 127).
Under these delicate geopolitical and challenging economic circumstances, PAP 
leaders like Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee, “the architect of Singapore’s economy,” 
chose a strategy of inviting foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) to develop industries.36)  The new government, with the assistance of the 
Economic Development Board (established in 1961 by the PAP), approached the United 
States, Japan, Europe, and the Commonwealth while keeping reasonably good relation-
ships with the former suzerain (ibid., 127–128).37)  The newly independent state thus 
became destined to survive as a “Global City” by opening the country wide to the 
world.38)
The Global City concept was introduced in 1972 by Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, who 
is best remembered as a minister for foreign affairs.  He expected Singapore to become 
an advanced city, connected through cable, satellite, international financial networks, 
air, and sea, catering to both regional and global destinations.  He conceptualized that 
Singapore’s survival would benefit from “a relationship of interdependence in the rapidly 
expanding global economic system” (Kwa 2006, 165–179).  Political will was exercised 
by the first generation of Singaporean leaders in choosing the national strategy of a Global 
City to feed the people, bring prosperity, and sustain the nation.  Achieving the goal, 
however, required multiple tasks, i.e., govern mental actions, in the newly born country.
Several components of Singapore’s industrialization strategy are well understood, 
including its legal system, tax incentives, and wage management.  However, the mecha-
nisms of the vigilant control of infectious diseases—which have resulted in the improve-
ment of population health—remain insufficiently understood.39)  Population health is an 
important factor for MNCs when evaluating investment risks.  While an acute “health 
36) According to Amitav Acharya, the young country’s strategy to invite MNCs actually ensured com-
mitted interests of the developed world in Singapore, which worked to provide the “foundation of 
its national security” (Acharya 2008, 25, 58).
37) In 1972, 46 percent of new foreign capital invested was from the United States, which became the 
second largest trade partner by 1973.  Other capital providers were Western Europe, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Australia (Turnbull 1982, 308).  The four top investors in 1980 were: 
26.3 percent UK, 22.5 percent US, 11.7 percent Japan, and 1.9 percent the Netherlands (MTI 2007, 
12).
38) According to Chong Guan Kwa, Singapore essentially counteracted the weaknesses and disadvan-
tages of a tiny city-state reliant on neighbors for survival (Kwa 2002, 123).
39) N. Ganesan mentions health along with housing and education as areas that were given priority by 
the PAP in the first two decades (Ganesan 2002, 53).
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shock” can quickly impact capital markets as seriously as a coup d’état or the assassina-
tion of an important politician, FDIs react more slowly.  Nevertheless, these long-term 
investors are likely to link unhealthy citizens to system failure or the incapability of 
policy makers (Tandon 2005, 1–3).  In other words, a government must first respond to 
problems of a public health nature.  Japan is a good example of this concept: there is a 
popular belief that Japan’s economic progress led to the successful control of infectious 
diseases, but in fact, its GNP rose sharply only after roundworm prevalence was lowered 
from 60 to 5 percent and schistosomiasis from nearly 15 to 2 to 1 percent in the early 
1960s (Takeuchi 2004, 177–179).
Since shortages in manpower in addition to scarcity of land could have been fatally 
disadvantageous for Singapore’s budding development, ensuring the health of the labor 
force became an essential prerequisite for the Singapore government, which required 
FDIs to build up industries, create jobs, and generate production.  Leaders saw it as their 
responsibility to furnish citizens with a solid structure in which they could “learn, work 
hard, be productive and be rewarded accordingly” (Lee 1998, 132).  Visualizing Singa-
pore’s transformation into “the cleanest and healthiest state in Asia,”40) the Lee Admin-
istration began improving social services.  As Kai Lok Chan (1985) notes, referring to 
the urban slum conditions in the mid-1960s (ibid., 56),41) a series of housing policies 
followed along with education and healthcare services.  Chairman of the Housing Devel-
opment Board (HDB) Lim Kim San, now popularly referred to as “Mr. HDB,” became 
minister for national development in 1963 and announced the Home Ownership Scheme 
in 1964.  The board started providing low-cost public housing to the low-income segment 
of the population  (Turnbull 1982, 316), amounting to 105,420 apartments between 1966 
and 1975 alone, thus increasing the percentage of total population living in public units 
from 24 to 54.8 percent (Chan 1985, 57).  The housing policy contributed to the improve-
ment in living conditions of those who had previously lived in slums.42)
Indeed, painstaking efforts were made to improve population health across the 
40) NUS 1967–June 1969, 80 (ST, August 8, 1968).
41) Rodney King (2008) disagrees with the depiction of the vulnerable and poor conditions of the new 
nation in 1965, claiming the description as “one of Singapore’s most enduring myths” (ibid., 7).
42) It is also known that strict quotas of Chinese, Malays, Indians, and others concurrently functioned 
as a solution to another English legacy: racial division.  Although the English language was pri-
oritized at school, given its neutrality and usefulness in business (Lee 2000, 173), the multiracial 
island-state adopted four official languages—English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil—in the process of 
fostering national cohesion.  Since several dialects of Chinese were used, a common use of Mandarin 
Chinese was promoted in the “Speak Mandarin” campaign that started in 1978.  Although the 
evaluation of Singapore’s education and language policy is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
government’s attention proved to be beneficial owing to the important role of languages in dissemi-
nating information relating to health.
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nation.43)  My data collection from the English language newspaper the Straits Times (ST) 
confirmed ample evidence of infectious diseases and the determination with which the 
Singapore government acted in the 1960s and 1970s.  Table 5 shows examples of these 
actions, with the five-year plan announced by the minister of health in 1970 declaring 
“[g]overnment’s effort of providing a better and healthier environment for the people 
to live in.”44)  The country had neither sufficient healthcare providers nor facilities.45) In
response, the government encouraged the local medical education system to produce 
more Singaporean doctors while at the same time ensuring sufficient doctor numbers by 
recruiting foreign doctors.  Five hospitals were built between 1960 and 1974; 13 outpa-
tient dispensaries in 1959 was doubled to 26 in 1974 (Barr 2005, 148).  As a result, there 
was one physician for every 1,404 people in 1971, an improvement from 1,968 people in 
1966.46)
Outbreaks of cholera and typhoid occurred almost every year in the early years.  In 
the year of independence, less than 80 percent of about 50,000 street hawkers involved 
in food services were licensed and knowledgeable about public hygiene, and these 
hawkers consequently attracted flies and rats (National Archives of Singapore 2008, 27). 
Intensive investigations of food-borne infectious diseases indeed often traced the route 
of transmission to those engaged in food services at local hawker centers and schools 
(Singapore Government 1967, 308).  In response, the Health Ministry occasionally issued 
warnings and introduced regulations to food handlers in the Hawkers Code in 1965.47)
Table 6 summarizes public health-related laws.  For example, The Environmental Public 
Health Act in 1969 made it illegal for premise occupiers not to “dispose of refuse or filth 
within 48 hours” and for anyone to litter in public places.
After its inauguration in September 1972, the new Ministry of the Environment took 
over the responsibility for environmental public health from the MOH, including vector 
control, food hygiene, and sanitation.48)  In October 1973, both ministries formed the Joint 
Coordinating Committee on Epidemic Diseases, joined by the National University of 
43) It is probable that altruism was not the only factor.  Defense, too, was a consideration since the PAP 
government had implemented a conscription system, now known as the National Service, starting 
from 1970 in response to the British withdrawal (Lee 2000, 42).
44) NUS June 1969–1970, 153 (ST, August 5, 1970).
45) Although Edwin Lee (2008) notes that Singapore inherited civil services “in good working order” 
from the suzerain (ibid., 266), the health services left behind by the British were vulnerable (Barr 
2005, 147).
46) Speech by Lee Kuan Yew at the fourth National Medial Convention dinner of the Singapore  Medical 
Association (NUS January–June 1972, 69–70 (ST, March 26, 1972)).
47) Licensing of all hawkers was implemented in 1966 (Singapore Government 1967, 310).
48) The ministry was established after Lee Kuan Yew set “an official national goal” to clean Singapore’s 
waterways (Dobbs 2003, 103), especially the Singapore River.
M. J. YOSHIKAWA322
Singapore, the MINDEF, and the Ministry of National Development.  A series of public 
persuasion campaigns was used to change collective and individual habits like littering, 
spitting, and smoking to improve the public environment (Liew 2006, 374–375).49) In
1976, the Ministry of Education supported the MOH in promoting the National Health 
Campaign to fight against infectious diseases.  The coordination across ministries and 
sectors in addition to campaign-based health education efforts characterizes Singapore’s 
infectious disease management even today.
In 1965, the infant mortality rate was 26.3 per 1,000 live births and life expectancy 
at birth was 64.5 years.  These figures had improved to 7.6 and 73.9 respectively by 1985 
(MTI 2007, 63).  The city-state has so far attracted MNCs in various successful indus-
tries.50)  The GDP increased from S$2.1 billion in 1961 to S$55.3 billion in 1989 (De 
49) Minister of Health, Yong Nyuk Lin proclaimed the start of a campaign to inform people of their 
responsibility to keep the nation clean.  The previous law was amended to apply “more punitive 
penalties for those littering public streets, drains and vacant sites on the island” (NUS 1967–June 
1969, 18 (ST, May 25, 1967)).  The anti-spitting campaigns in the 1960s cautioned the act would 
spread diseases like tuberculosis (Lee 2000, 199).  A two-week “Great Singapore Smokeout” cam-
paign was carried out in December 1980 (NUS 1979–1980, 328 (ST, December 16, 1980)).
50) These include oil-refining, petrochemicals, banking, tourism, semiconductors, telecommunications, 
electronics, and biomedicine. Today, the nation commands economic power that is disproportionate 
to the size of its territory and its total population of about five million.
Table 5 Details of Health-related Governmental Actions from the Straits Times Press Cuttings
Years of Volume (Page) Date of Article Details
1957–1966 (136) June 23, 1966 Establishment of the third general hospital of 
700 beds under the Second Five-Year 
Develop ment Plan
1967–June 1969 (2) January 28, 1967 Rearrangement of cleansing services to clean
up “polluted rivers and districts” to improve 
public health environment
1967–June 1969 (61) April 21, 1968 House-to-house investigation and cleansing
against flies in affected areas by the Public
Health Inspectorate
1967–June 1969 (112) December 17, 1968 Strict checking of swimming pools managed
by hotels, clubs, associations, or other
 organizations
June 1969–1970 (153) August 5, 1970 Announcement of a five-year plan by the MOH 
including relocation of 25,000 hawkers from
the streets to hawker centers
1971 (60) June 14, 1971 Issuance of 195 orders and summoning of eight
occupiers of mosquito-breeding premises 
according to the Destruction of Disease-
Bearing Insects Act
1971 (192) November 24, 1971 Establishment of a college to provide general
practitioners with continuing education for
raising standards
Source: NUS (1957–66; 1967–June 1969; 1971).
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Koninck et al. 2008, 42).  It can be said that the strong political leadership and govern-
mental efforts at the nascence of the state enabled a country with few natural resources 
to establish a good health system, which in part facilitated the investments from FDIs. 
While it is difficult to quantify, the health of Singaporean citizens may have contributed 
to the economic growth.51)
IV-2 Singapore’s Determination to Remain Open to the World
By the 1980s, Singapore had achieved good control of general infectious diseases under 
the leadership of the first generation of political leaders.  The baton was passed to the 
next-generation leader Goh Chok Tong and his administration.52)  Under Lee Kuan Yew, 
Goh had already demonstrated his dedication to public health by introducing the National 
Health Plan in 1983, introducing medical savings accounts, and restructuring the govern-
ment hospital program.  He believed that his people must be “physically fit, mentally 
tough, healthy, skilled, well-educated and economically productive” (Goh 1982, 84). 
Indeed, Goh “viewed social investments in health, education and housing as prerequisites 
to happiness and progress” (Phua 2009, 253–264).
Singapore’s inherent “optimal conditions” for pathogens (Goh 1983, ix) remain. 
These conditions are attributable to area-specific factors such as geographic location and 
an economy reliant on trade.  In a pandemic situation, EIDs might reach trading hubs 
sooner (Lee et al. 2007, 1056).  Since the 1990s, the Global City has seen Bengal cholera, 
multi-drug-resistant salmonellosis, norovirus gastroenteritis, Nipah virus infection, 
51) Similarly, referring to colonial days, Phua notes that a study could have been attempted on the 
relationship between health and development or human capital investment for the mining and 
plantation industries if reliable details had been available (Phua 1989, 322).
52) Goh was minister for health (1981–82), second minister of health (1982–84), first deputy prime 
minister (1985–90), and prime minister (1990–2004).
Table 6 Laws to Control Infectious Diseases Introduced/Amended by the Government in the First 11 Years
Year Name of Laws
1968 Destruction of Disease-Bearing Insects Act
1969
Environmental Public Health Act
Environmental Public Health (Markets) Regulations
Environmental Public Health (Hawkers) Regulations
1970 Environmental Public Health (Public Cleansing) Regulations
1973 Environmental Public Health (Food Establishment) RegulationsEnvironmental Public Health (Food Handlers) Regulations
1974 Environmental Public Health (Manufacture and Sale of Ice Cream) Regulations
1976 Infectious Diseases Act
Source: Constructed from National Archives of Singapore (2008, 118) and Goh (1983).
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meningococcal disease, and hand-foot-and-mouth disease (Goh et al. 2006, 301).53)  SARS 
clearly tested the leadership skills of the second generation of political leaders in infec-
tious disease management.  We have seen Singapore’s renewed determination to fight 
against the health threats not only nationally but also regionally.  Singapore proposed 
that health ministers discuss regional cooperation to control SARS at the ASEAN Sum-
mit in Bangkok in April 2003 (Phua 2009, 262–263).  In light of the transnational nature 
of EIDs, Prime Minister Goh agreed to jointly establish the Regional Emerging Diseases 
Intervention Center in Singapore with the United States.
To understand why public health management of EIDs is a problem of national 
importance in Singapore, it is important to stress that Singapore’s compact geographical 
size does not guarantee successful containment of infectious diseases.  The seemingly 
advantageous smallness could rather be a disadvantage; it exposes a large portion of the 
country at once when a deadly epidemic takes place, as there are few alternative spaces 
to relocate uninfected individuals.  To make matters worse, the tiny population size sug-
gests that high prevalence could easily cause dysfunction in the country’s system.  Hence, 
Singapore has little margin for error.  The high population density and people’s move-
ments in Singapore point to serious consequences in population health, economy, and 
society if the country fails to control EIDs.  Therefore, the government is aware of the 
very high cost of inaction.  This conviction could result in governmental intervention in 
infectious diseases that may sometimes seem aggressive or draconian.
In August 2004, Goh was succeeded by Lee Hsien Loong, who had played a vital 
role under the Goh Cabinet during the SARS outbreak, as described earlier.  Although 
public health intervention in the transmission of EIDs often requires forceful measures, 
it is becoming more difficult to impose intrusions of privacy, especially in developed areas 
today.  In Singapore, there are at least two area-specific difficulties that the current 
leadership may face.  The first difficulty refers to the election on May 7, 2011.  The ruling 
PAP not only lost the Aljunied Group Representation Constituency to the Workers’ Party 
but also suffered from a declined share of votes—from 66.6 percent in 2006 to 60.1 per-
cent.54)  The issues with which the general public has expressed unhappiness seem to 
include: styles of public decision-making, reduced interaction between the government 
and citizens, and the perceived socioeconomic class privilege of foreign executives.55)
Singapore might be finding it difficult to cope with its own economic achievements, which 
53) Bengal cholera is caused by a new cholera biotype, Vibrio cholerae O139.
54) Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong resigned from the cabinet as the minister mentor and the senior 
minister, respectively, after the election.
55) Singapore’s Gini coefficient score—measuring income gap—stood at one of the world’s highest, 
0.425 in 2008 (Han et al. 2011, 143).
Singapore’s Prescription for Successful Control of Transnational Emerging Infectious Diseases 325
have been realized too fast.  The second difficulty is the demography of populations.  Only 
64 percent of Singapore’s population is composed of citizens, and there is a large influx 
of foreign workers and visitors.  Securing sympathy toward the importance of public 
health intervention may become even more challenging for the government.  Should 
there be any future serious threats to the city-state, implementation of strict infectious 
disease control and solicitation of public support could become a more challenging task 
for Singapore.
There are several limitations to this study.  Historical reviews were largely concen-
trated in the first two decades of independence, and the relationship between healthy 
labor and FDI could not be quantified conclusively.  The political will of the current 
administration to control EIDs has yet to be substantiated.  However, we can see Singa-
pore’s increasing international contribution in EID management, especially after the 
SARS ordeal.  For example, a week-long training program was jointly sponsored by 
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan International Cooperation Agency in 
2008.  I personally observed experts in infectious disease control from Singapore enthu-
siastically explain the experiences of SARS and plans against H5N1 influenza to partici-
pants from seven ASEAN countries.56)
V Conclusion
The previously unknown SARS suddenly required Singapore to prescribe a panacea.  This 
paper scrutinized tools utilized by the city-state, and elucidated the important role of the 
Singapore government in promoting and supporting the public health measures.  The 
determination of political leaders to control the SARS outbreak was demonstrated through 
the total governmental approach.  It involved top political leaders, ministers, and public 
servants, and initiated public-private cooperation.  The mechanism enabling the compact 
country to carry out grand and quick public health measures included government-linked 
Singapore-style grassroots organizations, which played vital roles in rapidly deploying 
the rather scarce human resources of the country.  In addition, the government adhered 
to timely and accurate information disclosure.  It also facilitated improvements of health-
care settings and environmental health.  To implement strict measures such as home 
quarantines, the government rapidly enacted or revised laws to enable the authorities to 
56) In addition, anti-dengue events hosted by Singapore jointly with the WHO annually since 2008 are 
encouraging, as Singapore’s comprehensive vector control has so far resulted in moderate preva-
lence of domestic transmission (Yoshikawa 2010, 59).
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enforce the measure, supplied facilities within a short time, and provided necessary 
public health, social, and financial support to the quarantined people.  Political leaders 
preempted socially destructive stigma against healthcare workers, patients, and quaran-
tined individuals before it became out of control, and relieved the significant part of 
economic damage.  All of these measures point to Singapore’s uncompromising political 
will that enabled the formulation and implementation of strategies to control SARS. 
Hence, Singapore’s prescription revealed one factor that was different from economic 
prosperity or compact territorial size.
This paper also argued that Singapore’s past health policy, including vigilant infec-
tious disease control, has promoted population health, which has in turn likely contributed 
to economic and trade activities in the two decades following the country’s independence. 
Bringing health to citizens and transforming Singapore into an attractive place were 
prerequisites for the first generation of political leaders to invite FDIs, which subse-
quently contributed to securing survival and prosperity for Singapore.  Therefore, it can 
be said that Singapore is a country that has realized the national importance of containing 
infectious diseases from early in its history.
The quick control of SARS in Singapore depicts the national stance of making it a 
priority to defend the nation’s competitiveness in the international market.  The  mission 
to continue fighting against EIDs is never more applicable to any other countries than 
Singapore because the Republic is one of the most trade-dependent nations.  Active 
governmental intervention in infectious disease control might depend on how high the 
respective government places the issue of EIDs in the agenda, i.e., whether or not lead-
ers prioritize responsibilities in solving public health problems.  The data presented in 
this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that active governmental intervention in 
the SARS outbreak was ensured by the historically embedded political will in the Re public 
of Singapore.  The understanding of the fatal connection between the emergence of 
public health threats and damage to national viability prompted political leaders in Singa-
pore to persuade the general public to work with the government and play a part in 
maintaining a good public health environment.  This paper documented the country’s 
irreversible commitment to drive away public health threats.
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